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urozone  authorities  have  no  time  to  lose  and  need  to  move  banking  supervision 
rapidly  to  the  European  Central  Bank,  using  an  existing  EU  Treaty  article  as 
justification.  This  will  give  the  ECB  direct  information  about  the  soundness  of 
individual banks for its liquidity-providing operations and restore market confidence. The 
current  cooperative  model  is  patently  not  working.  In  addition,  the  recent  draft  deposit 
guarantee Directive needs to be amended to create a single fund for the eurozone, which 
should also act as resolution authority. 
Apart  from  a  single  regulatory  framework,  which  is  largely  in  place,  a  banking  union 
requires  a  single  supervisory  authority,  a  common  deposit  protection  and  a  harmonised 
bank  resolution  and  liquidation  system.  These  three  elements  already  exist  in  some 
embryonic form, but they urgently need further elaboration.  
A fast and secure way to implement the eurozone banking union is to apply Art. 127.6 of the 
EU Treaty (TFEU). This article, which is part of the Maastricht Treaty, allows the Council of 
Finance  Ministers,  acting  unanimously,  to  confer  specific  tasks  relating  to  the prudential 
supervision of banks to the ECB. Although this had been seen as a superfluous or remote 
possibility before the financial crisis, it is the quick fix we need today. It is also consistent 
with a trend observed since the financial crisis to move prudential supervision back to the 
central banks. 
The main argument before the crisis not to involve the central bank in banking supervision 
was the possible conflict between monetary policy and financial supervisory functions. The 
crisis underscored the need for more information about the financial system at central bank 
level, even more in a eurozone context, where supervision remains decentralised, far away 
from the monetary policy function. The cooperative EBA model has already been discredited 
by the facts, most clearly in the Spanish bank bail-out case. 
A second step is the creation of a single deposit protection fund. Such funds are fragmented 
in the EU today, functioning with different statutes and forms of financing. A timid 2010 EU 
proposal to bring more harmonisation to deposit protection systems and entailing a window 
for co-financing between funds is stuck before the European Parliament and Council. The 
European Commission should withdraw the proposal and propose an EU-wide pre-funded 
system. Such a fund could also be used to restructure banks, as is the case in the US with the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Taking a contribution of 1.25% of all eligible 
deposits  in  the  EU,  as proposed  by  the Commission, such  a  fund  could  dispose  of  €100 
billion today. 
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A unified bank resolution and liquidation scheme is a third necessary step. The European 
Commission’s  proposal  of  June  6th  goes  a  long  way  towards  an  EU  framework,  with 
mandatory resolution plans, early intervention triggers and tools, asset claims and bail-ins. 
However, since the proposal is a directive and not a regulation, it leaves implementation in 
the hands of the many EU member state authorities, which would have to form complex 
resolution colleges for large cross-border banking groups, and eventually agree on keys for 
burden-sharing. In addition, the trigger for early intervention is the Tier 1 ratio of the CRD 
IV, the EU’s version of Basel III, which is relative and elastic because of the risk weighting of 
assets. A leverage ratio would have been far preferable.   
Five years after the start of the financial crisis, the EU has lost precious time in responding. It 
has always been loathe to upset existing structures of the nation states, initially by giving 
more tasks to advisory-only committees, then by creating tiny subordinate authorities, and 
by agreeing with huge and costly banking bail-outs. The acceptance of a banking union must 
be taken to its full significance and be put in operation rapidly. The idea should not become 
one of the other acronyms of European integration, devoid of any real significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 